The Literature Review Part 5 – The ‘Ground War’: nuts and bolts campaigning techniques

Posted on

The ‘Ground War’: nuts and bolts campaigning techniques

As mentioned previously, there are several excellent recent US ‘campaigning manuals’ such as Campaign Craft by Shea and Burton, Winning elections by R.A. Faucheaux, and
No place for amateurs by Dennis Johnson. A recent UK addition to this stable is  The political campaigning book: real lessons from the front line by Lionel Zetter. These manuals explain important foundations such as campaign strategy, research and targeting as well as ‘nuts and bolts campaigning like use of databases, direct mail, doorknocking, phoning, candidate and team training, volunteers, community issue campaigns, use of local media and the like. Errington and van Onselen cite Shea and Burton in the paper Electoral databases: big brother or democracy unbound? They explain how the professionalisation of American campaigns includes the hiring of consultants for database management. Similar (though decentralised) databases now feature prominently in Australian political campaigns as well as MP’s offices. The authors note that “over a decade after their introduction” the major parties are still unwilling to discuss the details of their electoral databases, although they do obtain training and operation manuals of the Feedback database system from Liberal Party sources.

It is explained that “the development of the Liberal Party’s Feedback database was part of a national review of the Coalition’s 1990 election campaign” in which it “was generally recognised that the ALP had out-campaigned the Coalition in key marginal seats”. Lessons were learned from the US Republicans about the superior “development of targeted campaigning” and although the relevant software was not imported, due to “technical difficulties, and differences between the two political systems”, a similar system was developed locally.

The party-control of the Feedback and Electrac systems in Australia contrasts with larger political market in the US, “where the decentralised major political parties, as well as private campaigns for ballot initiatives, have ensured the development of a lively political database industry.”

Voter contact is an essential element of any political campaign, especially for challengers facing greater resources from incumbents. A great selection of examples of different voter contact techniques can be found in Margaret Saville’s book The Battle For Bennelong : The Adventures of Maxine McKew, Aged 50 Something where she recounts tales of doorknocking, community meetings, phone canvassing, shopping centre visits, school fetes and more.

Playford to Dunstan provides some great examples of doorknocking prowess in 1960s Australia. It states that “the major parties geared their campaigns to the obviously marginal seats” and “local strategy in the marginals emphasised personal canvassing” and “troops are out in the biggest sustained doorknocking exercise the State has known”. One candidate claimed to have “doorknocked 90 per cent of the homes in the district” and his opponent “in the two years since his endorsement he had managed to visit every home in the constituency twice.” Another candidate complimented his “seven months of doorknocking prior to polling day” with “over a dozen” public meetings with “an average attendance of 150”.

Much of the literature in the US about nuts and bolts campaigning techniques speaks about ‘voter turnout’ or ‘GOTV’ (get out the vote) and there is a false assumption amongst many campaigners in Australia that our persuasion-focused strategies mean that these techniques are not relevant. Although it can be argued that voter turnout strategies and techniques are not directly applicable in the Australian context, anyone who has been doorknocking in both the US and Australia (as well as in the UK and NZ) will concede that good personal contact techniques are largely universal. Even though they may not be directly applicable, they are certainly (like any good campaign technique from any source) adaptable to an Australian political environment. For example, the technology and investment in a microtargeting survey combined with a doorknocking campaign can be used to maximise voter turnout of partisan voters as well as swinging voters. The survey questions may need to be refined, as well as the scripts for the volunteers, but the fundamental mechanical process would be very similar, as would the cost (in money and volunteers)

In a 1999 study Does Canvassing Increase Voter Turnout? A Field Experiment based on a randomised field experiment involving 30,000 registered voters, Gerber and Green concluded that voter turnout was “increased substantially by personal canvassing, slightly by direct mail, and not at all by telephone calls (from a phone bank).” The research found “personal canvassing has a far greater influence on voter participation than three pieces of professionally crafted mail delivered within two weeks of Election Day”. A very interesting aspect of this paper is the hypothesis that “the decline of personal mobilization has arguably contributed to the erosion of voter turnout in the United States since the 1960s.”

This correlates to the arguments made by others in Australia such as Sally Young and Andrew Leigh that an overemphasis on new campaign techniques such as mass marketing through television has discouraged voter interest in political discourse as they become more personally detached from it and often only see negative aspects via the mainstream media. This also meets with the professional campaigners viewpoint in that although people traditionally complain about disruptive election campaigns and no-one likes to have their busy home-lives interrupted by political canvassers, there is an expectation that all MPs and candidates will spend a significant amount of their time and resources keeping in touch with their constituency, listening to their voters and personally finding out what is happening to people throughout their electorates. Candidates who display these desirable traits should, all else being equal, be more attractive to voters.

Earlier American research, such as Blydenburgh’s 1971 paper A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning recorded how several candidates performed in a campaign for local office. The experiment was designed to measure the impact of door-to-door canvassing and telephone solicitation. He cites similar studies in the US dating back to elections in the 1920s and although concedes that variables between candidates and different election types cloud his results, comes to the reasonable conclusion that local campaigning will have a greater effect in contest where the message is not influenced by mass media, such as in local government elections.

Conversely, in Constituency Campaigning In Parliamentary Systems With Preferential Voting: Is there a Paradox? Bowler, Farrell and McAllister argue that “local campaigning has a very limited impact on the vote” and “concludes with an explanation for the apparent paradox of why candidates bother campaigning when it does not make a difference to their vote” by hypothesising that the activity is designed to impress their colleagues and the party as much as it is design to gain an electoral advantage. The paper focuses on data from the 1993 AES. The first possible problem with this analysis is that 1993 was a very unusual election in that it revolved around a very public (i.e. undertaken via the mass media) discussion about the new Goods and Services Tax which the Hewson Liberals were proposing. Secondly, the study categorises “constituency work” as “local campaigning” and even though it includes the disclaimer “the actual degree to which local constituency work attracts votes is still a matter of debate” it does not differentiate between “constituency work” and “local campaigning” in any marketing or voter canvassing context.

An alternate view can be found in the UK, which correlates more closely with the American research. Whiteley and Seyd show in Local Party Campaigning and Electoral Mobilization in Britain that “local campaigning by Labour party members had a significant influence on the Labour vote share in the 1987 election, but not on turnout.”

In another UK article Hanging on the telephone? Doorstep and Telephone Canvassing at the British General Election of 1997. Pattie and Johnston reiterate the findings of Gerber and Green and warn “it would be premature and counterproductive for parties to write off their electoral activists” as “face-to-face canvassing paid electoral dividends.” 146 p 322

Denver and Hands et al in Constituency Campaigning in Britain 1992-2001: Centralization and Modernization”. Write that constituency (local) campaigning in British general elections has been transformed over the past ten years or so. Firstly, national party headquarters have taken an increasingly large role in planning and managing constituency campaigns. Although the pace of change has varied across the major parties, all are heading down the same road. Secondly, campaigning on the ground has also changed. Technological and other changes have led to a decline in the use of traditional campaign techniques and increased use of new methods, especially in `key’ seats.

In her 2005 research paper for the Australian Parliamentary Library Sarah Miskin stated that in the 2004 federal election, “Direct mail continued to be an important campaign tool, especially in the marginal electorates. The media estimated that the two major parties spent $5 million each on this method of wooing voters. A 2001 study found that such spending was justified because direct-mail and letterbox-drop literature was the primary source of policy information for 41 per cent of those canvassed.”

Miskin also cites Errington and van Onselen as having “discussed the sophisticated national databases that the major parties now maintain in order to build profiles of voter interests and target party messages accordingly”.

Errington’s and van Onselen’s paper “Electoral Databases: Big Brother or Democracy Unbound?” is very detailed in it’s explanations of political databases like the Liberal Pparty’s Feedback program.

Miskin also quotes their article in the Sydney Morning Herald “X files are keeping odds stacked in favour of MPs” where they state

Databases are all about helping political parties ensure that their messages are relevant to the recipients. The big parties are already spending less money on broadcast advertising and diverting their resources towards more targeted campaigns.”

Miskin notes the criticisms from some political commentators “that sitting MPs were able to use taxpayer ‘bucks’—in the form of parliamentary printing and mail allowances—to pay for their direct mail.

In an interview with Age reporter Michelle Grattan, Former Victorian Liberal Party president Michael Kroger was quoted as saying that the benefits of incumbency (including staff, office and phone as well as printing and mail allowances) were worth $1.5 million to an MP over three years.

Mills describes in detail how “the advent of direct mail to Australian politics highlights the American derivation of many of our new political technologies.” Richard Viguerie “is the acknowledged high priest of direct mail” and he “encouraged the Liberals to become the first Australian party to use direct mail.” Using Viguerie’s advice, the Liberals became successful fundraisers in the early 1980s, “utilising the American techniques in copyrighting and list management.” Because of the size of the American market, their commercial techniques are naturally more thoroughly tested and proven. In 1984 The NSW Liberal’s Key Electorates Appeal direct mail fundraising campaign won a gold medal from the Australian Direct Marketing Association.”

Mills writes that “the secret of direct mail is emotionalism. Direct mail copywriters have an old formula called AIDA, an acronym for Attention, Interest, Desire, and Action. According to one direct mail specialist, the message has to be extreme…” But this extremism in language can backfire in an Australian context. Mills writes that “the moderate success of the (Liberal fundraising) election mailing was marred by the resentment caused amongst some swinging voters by the forceful language used in the letters.” This is particularly concerning given the compulsory voting laws in Australia and highlights a weakness in adopting American campaign techniques without some consideration of the need to adapt or modify them for the Australian political landscape.

New technologies are anticipated. Recent use of sms as a local organising tool, for internal communications such as to alert candidates and volunteers to campaign messages and activities are becoming more widespread. Although there have been examples of sms use in public campaigning, it is still in its infancy, mostly likely restricted by the ability to send out a thoughtful and intelligent message in 160 characters or less! Sally Young writes about a recent example in a Gold Coast by-election in which nightclub owners supported an independent campaign against the incumbent Mayor, who was proposing to restrict club opening hours. The nightclub owners collected mobile numbers during a promotion with their clients and used those numbers to send several messages to their clients including “Gary Baildon thinks your vote won’t count because you’re young and go to nightclubs. He wants you in bed by 3am. Don’t let him tell you what to do! Vote him out!”

Plasser notes that the new campaign techniques, as modelled on lessons and observations from the US, have not replaced traditional Australian campaign techniques but have, as Warhurst describes, “been superimposed on the latter and has displaced it from the focus of attention.” He writes that “although there seems to be plenty of evidence that Australian campaign styles have moved closer toward the US model” there is also “convincing evidence for the viability of prevailing country- and culture-specific Australian campaign styles, determined by regulatory frameworks, the alternative preference vote, compulsory voting, public finance of elections, and the party-driven dynamics of political competition.”

Not all that is written about local campaign techniques by political parties in Australia is accurate because the parties have until recently gone to great lengths to maintain competitive advantages over their rivals by keeping details about various techniques confidential. In his book on the 1987 campaign Warhurst writes (based on a couple of different newspaper reports) that the ALP used “a telephone survey called Polfile” and in one electorate alone “sixty-five separate personalised letters were sent to electors selected through telephone surveying”. Most likely this second-hand account describes the use of a direct mail and database program called Polfile (the clunkier predecessor to the ALP’s Electrac, which Errington and van Onselen have written about extensively). Polfile is not a telephone survey, although it can feasibly be used to generate the contact or calling lists for such a survey, as can any list based on the electoral roll and white pages, both publicly available through commercial sources such as those described earlier.

Previous notes about the 2005-2007 ACTU YRAW campaign have referred to its importance in framing debate during federal election and the online component, but it is important to remember that its success was largely based on its mobilisation effort.

Under the sub-heading “UNION MOBILISATION—SOME IMPLICATIONS” in the article Election 2007: Did the union campaign succeed? Spies-Butcher and Wilson explain that “In America, politics in recent years have been shaped by greater mobilisation of the union vote for the Democrats under a reformist AFL-CIO leadership that won office in 1996 (and their new rivals in the ‘Change to Win’ coalition). Union mobilisation of the vote is an offshoot of political unionism that (recognises)… the union movement depends not only on a strong shopfloor presence but on a favourable legal and political environment as well.” The lessons of union mobilisation in the US were applied successfully by the ACTU and its affiliates in Australia in 2007. “Like the American labour movement, the ACTU has offset its declining natural constituency by more strongly mobilising its remaining membership, renewing it in the process. And so the tactics the ACTU employed during the 2007 election were much closer to those of a grass roots mobilisation than to the simple increase in resources, or targeted promises, that accompany other marginal seat campaigns. This is important both in highlighting the continuing power and importance of the union movement in Australia, and in opening up the possibility of the broader significance of electoral mobilisation by social movements. Perhaps the era of activist electoral politics is not yet dead, but waiting to be remobilised.”

Andrew Leigh’s home-grown studies (with some theoretical underpinning from US and UK research) demonstrate very elaborate investigation into demographics and electoral behaviour. Using “a large repeated cross-sectional dataset from 1966 to 2001” Leigh undertakes innovative research which shows partisan tendencies based on various demographic characteristics such as wealth, neighbourhood, age, gender and immigration.

The Literature Review Part 4 – the ‘Air War’: advertising, earned media, TV, the Internet and new technologies

Posted on Updated on

Comparing the ‘Air War’: advertising, earned media,  TV, the Internet and new technologies

Competitive Australian political practitioners have always been keen to learn from the most professional democracy industry and innovators in the world. Young describes Labor’s experimentation with TV in the 1960s “Part of their inspiration and source of some of their ideas came from observing US elections and imitating American campaign techniques.”

Using documents from the National Library, Young writes that “In 1964, Cyril S Wyndham, the general Secretary of the Labor Party, had argued in an internal memo that “Ultimately, the Party will have to face up to the need for an effective television scheme” (Sourced from NLA manuscripts, MS4985, Box 141, folder 178, 1964. ‘Improvement in public relations – Memo from General Secretary to the national organising Committee.’)”

Bob Hogg describes how the 1966 federal election campaign led by Arthur Calwell “was at the exact moment (in Australian politics) when the hall meeting was overtaken by television.” Hogg’s explanation though is that this TV revolution did not occur for any reason of American influence or presidentialisation of the campaign. He explains that the campaign simply continued earlier practices of focussing on the leader “just as it did in Curtin and Chifley’s days” and the “capacity of the leader to handle new forms of communication had always been critical to a successful campaign”. He goes on to explain that the leader’s campaign effort was but one piece in a complicated jigsaw and successful Australian political campaigns require a similar effort (to that of the leader) from the whole front bench as well as local members.

Young states that the “revolutionary” nature of the “It’s time” TV ads was the way it transformed the techniques used and replaced the “dull talking heads of a speaker talking to the camera” with a market-tested slogan. Young also points to influences from a famous American book “The Selling Of the President” by Joe McGinnis, which gave an inside account of the lead up to the 1968 US presidential election. Nixon’s staffers were told to ‘give him words to say that will show his emotional involvement in the issues. He is inclined to be too objective, too much the lawyer building a case, too cold and logical.” Two years later, the market research prepared by ‘Spectrum International’ for the ALP advised the lawyer Whitlam to ‘state his policies in emotional rather than factual terms’.

In 1984 a book was written by Ed Diamond, which followed a study of political TV ads and concluded that all followed “an unwritten style book of conventions”. The book The Spot outlines four phases of a typical advertising campaign: Introduction, Argument, Attack and Vision.

Mills identifies several shortcomings in the Diamond theory, namely that there is no allowance for targeting, there is the assumption that the audience for all the ads is similar and the uniqueness of the Australian context, where a two-type typology is more logical: negative and positive. Yet Mills gives a detailed account of one example of a US TV attack/negative ad (the 1956 Democrat ad against Eisenhower) in which a “How’s that again?” is used to highlight and question a statement by the opposition candidate and undermine their credibility. Mills explains that both Labor and Liberal parties used a similar ad in 1975.

Since 1984, every Australian federal election campaign except 1987 has featured a televised leader’s debate. McAllister notes in The Personalization of Politics (2005) that “the popular focus on leaders is now commonplace across almost all the major parliamentary systems, where parties once occupied centre stage.” McAllister identifies the common explanation of “the growth of electronic media” but also states that “no single explanation accounts for the increasing personalisation of politics in democratic societies and that what has been occurring is complex and multi-causal.”

Plasser writes that now “campaigns are fought and won on television” and “numerous studies have dealt with the impact of television on prevailing campaign practices from a comparative perspective, reaching more or less identical conclusions: television has changed campaign practices in an unprecedented way.”

Mills describes the “manifestation of what American researchers have labelled the metacampaign – competition for favourable judgements from the political elite (pollsters, senior journalists, donors, etc.) about their ‘electability’.” Mills explain how “each of which has a multiplier effect amongst the general voting population.”

Reporting designed primarily for political junkies such as Sky News would further exacerbate Mills’ “multiplier effect”. Sky News captures only 0.5 per cent of the Australian TV audience but is compulsory viewing for campaign and political professionals and those who write about them. Modern online communities described as “netroots” and “blogocracy” also sometimes persuade stories and opinions in the mainstream media. The metacampaign and its multiplier effect are further complicated by the filtering of political message which the mainstream media conducts as a matter of course. Sally Young found “that the average election-news story is only two minutes long – and during this story, the reporter and host speak for more than half the time while politicians speak only in 7 second soundbites”. Worse still were examples from “town halls-style” speeches such as the Liberal Party campaign launch where “John Howard delivered a speech for 42 minutes but that night on the evening news, voters heard only 10.4 seconds of it. We know from American research that the soundbite has shrunk over time, keeps on shrinking and that they have less soundbites on their news compared to ours. So, if we follow American trends in news production – and we often seem to – this will happen here as well.”

Philip Senior wrote in 2007 that “Although the influence of political leaders in determining electoral outcomes has been the subject of research in the United States and Canada for a number of decades (see Stokes, Campbell and Miller 1958; Miller and Levitin 1976), it is only since the 1980s that it has received scholarly attention in Australia. Over the past two decades a significant volume of research has emerged examining the existence of leadership effects in Australian elections, and the fact that the popularity of party leaders exerts an influence on vote choice is now well established Leadership effects are significant and visible features of national elections, and have regularly accounted for 1–2% of the national vote, and as much as 4% or more on some occasions”. However, Senior’s analysis reveals that the evidence does not support the conclusion that voters have become more sensitive to evaluations of major party leaders over the period examined (six federal elections from 1990–2004).

In a 2002 study “Television Effects and Voter Decision Making in Australia: A Re-examination of the Converse Model” Denemark used Australian data “to re-examine Converse’s thesis that the mass media’s electoral effects are felt most strongly amongst voters with the lowest levels of political interest and awareness.” His results show that voters with the lowest levels of prior political awareness are the most responsive to effects of overall television news exposure, and they employ those media cues in their vote decisions late in the campaign.

‘Earned media’ can be used to repeat and promote advertisements which would otherwise go unnoticed by the general public. The key is to get the interest of the professional media in reporting aspects of the political strategy, message or plan.

Greg Daniel was Managing Director of the NSW Liberal Party’s advertising firm The Campaign Palace in 1987 and also discusses the Liberal TV ads which appeared during their ‘dress rehearsal’ prior to the 1988 election: “We needed the dress rehearsal particularly to convince the media that we were a professional unit. Until that time they’d regarded us – with some degree of correctness – as a bit of a joke in terms of our ability to organise and run a campaign. So we had to change that perception and one of the simplest ways to impress journalists seems to be with television commercials. So we prepared one that said we were ready when we weren’t. The commercial was made with the hope that it would galvanise the party into believing it was ready and members would start acting out the role the commercial portrayed, with Greiner as Premier already. This is a lesson we learnt from Brian Dale’s book (Ascent to Power, Wran and the Media, Allen and Unwin, 1985) about Wran’s win in ‘75/’76. Labor created the feeling of the inevitability of government.

Andrew Hughes defined negative advertising as advertising that targets the attacked candidate’s weakness in issues or image and that highlights the sponsoring candidate’s strengths in these areas by sending a negatively framed message.

Sally Young describes how there is a large body of US research which has found that the use of negative political advertising grew dramatically in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. In Australia however there has been only “informal speculation” that variously describes the increasing negativity of TV advertising as the “Americanisation” of Australian political advertising or “American-style TV attack ads”.

Sally Young also refers to writing by Ward & Cook (1992) which expresses fear that there are considerable dangers to democracy in Australia ‘whilst the parties continue to imitate American campaign methods.’

In a 2004 parliamentary library research note Political Advertising In Australia Sarah Miskin and Richard Grant explore some important aspects of Australian political advertising, including the current legislation, the debates over ‘truth’ in content and the claims that Australia’s political parties are opting for ‘Americanised’ election advertisements “primarily based on negative or ‘attack’ advertising”. An accusation by former Labor leader Mark Latham that a Liberal Party advertisement targeting his alleged failings as a mayor was ‘dishonest’ and ‘personal’ and reflected ‘American-style negative advertising’ contradicts findings from political scientists like Sally Young who show that, “rather than reflecting a shift to Americanised techniques, negativity in campaigning was already a quite distinctly Australian feature”, although she “acknowledges that a more recent move towards personalised, rather than general, negative advertising in Australia can be seen to reflect American campaign-advertising styles.”

Sally Young’s research shows that “comparing the results with overseas studies which have used the same methodology suggests that negative political advertising is higher in Australia than in most comparable Western democracies—including the US. However, there are still some important differences in emphasis. Negative ads in the U.S. focus more on the personal characteristics of opponents than in Australia—where negative ads still generally focus on policy and performance issues.” Young also writes that her research suggests that “negative advertising in Australia is not an entirely new trend, nor a result of ‘Americanisation’” but has in fact “a long history in Australia” due to a fiercely partisan two-party adversarial system”.

In an article of the 1998 Australian federal election in the journal Electoral Studies, David Butler writes “Both sides spent heavily on extensive and overwhelmingly negative television advertising. Voters in marginal seats received a lot of direct mail.”

Sally Young compared the ads in the 2000 US presidential election, where “71% of American ads contained a personal attack, compared to only 6% of ads used in the nearest Australian election in 2001.” But in 1993 “a massive 75% of federal election ads in Australia were negative compared to 37% of American political ads in 1992.”

One would expect this negativity in Australian ads, whilst already much higher than American comparisons, will actually increase over coming years since regulations were dramatically liberalised in the 2004 federal election when “the Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations (FACTS) ceased its self-appointed role of scrutinizing the content of political ads for veracity after discovering that the requirements of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 did not apply to political advertising.”

Young also quotes an observation by Stephen Mills and H O’Neil (of which I have been unable to find an original copy) that “Australian ads deal… more with arguing and attacking than American ads”.

No historical overview of negative political advertising in Australia would be complete without discussion of ‘John Henry Austral’, a character in a radio drama created by Sim Rubensohn, Liberal advertising agent in 1948. Mills describes Menzies re-election in 1949 as “the first use in Australian politics of recognisable ‘modern’ advertising techniques.”

Don Whitington, in his book, The Rulers, describes Menzies as the first Australian politician to seriously exploit the electronic media and to cultivate a public image through extensive PR work.

Bridget Griffen-Foley describes how the Liberals Federal President Richard Casey wrote to Menzies “about a discovery he made as ambassador in Washington. Casey learned from American friends about a new profession called ‘Public Relations’ that had developed in the 1930s. After consulting a leading practitioner in New York, Casey became convinced of the need to create a favourable atmosphere to advance one’s cause.”

Casey hired Rubensohn in 1947 after learning he had split from his former federal Labor employers over the Chifley Government’s plans to nationalise banks. In a letter to Menzies in 1949 (cited by Sally Young from the National library) , Rubensohn describes his preference for negative advertising:

“My experience is that vigorous attack directed against chinks in the other man’s political armour is of vital importance in assuring the effectiveness of election advertising. I feel very strongly on this point. I am convinced that non-militant advertising no matter how ‘positive’ its underlying message may be, is ineffectual, lacks attention value, is unconvincing and a waste of money.”

Rubensohn utilised the popular radio drama format of the 30s and 40s to deliver Menzies’ political message into the lounge rooms of Australian voters. He created a character ‘John Henry Austral’ who, according to Mills “for more than 18 months presented dramatised accusations to the nation about the Chifley Government’s socialist sins.”

Mills delves deeply into the John Henry Austral story and bases much of his analysis on the archived letters between Menzies and Rubensohn held in the national Library, as well as thesis by Sim Rubensohn’s daughter Victoria Braund titled Themes in political advertising, Australian Federal Election campaigns 1949-1972. There is also an online article by Robert Crawford Modernising Menzies, Whitlam, and Australian Elections which cites Mills and Braund and links the two campaigns and “their innovative use of electronic media” as the prime examples “which helped usher Australian politics into the modern era”.

It’s clear from the descriptions that Austral’s commentaries were a clever combination of anti-communist fear-mongering and nationalist concerns. Mills explains that “Austral’s preference for the Liberal Party as the panacea to the nation’s problems was never too deeply hidden’ but that Austral “presented himself as an independent commentator whose Liberal sympathies sprang less from partisanship than from nationalism and common-sense rejection of the amorphous and emotional horrors that Labor was inflicting.” The Liberals spent a relative fortune on this radio campaign and used it as a complement to another advertising idea borrowed from America “Country Quiz” which the Liberal party sponsored. Mills states it was estimated that the Liberals spent a million pounds winning the 1949 federal election. The important lessons of the campaign (such as the use of electronic media to broadcast aggressive and emotional advertising as well as the centralisation of the campaign in the federal party organisation) “were not repeated for the 23 years of Liberal rule. Even after Rubensohn came back to the Labor side, such a campaign was financially impossible and probably politically impossible too.”

Victoria Rubensohn writes that during the 23 years of Liberal rule following the 1949 election, “Australian elections tended to be fought with pre-war, pre-mass-media techniques” with text heavy print advertisements of policy promises and dogma.

It was not until the 1972 ‘It’s Time” campaign that electronic advertising seemed to again play such a dramatic role in an Australian election. Again, Rubensohn was part of the team, his agency having previously merged with the American advertising giant McCann Erikson. Mills writes that the “It’s Time” campaign “bears most of the Austral insurgency hallmarks of long-term advertising and disciplined centralisation.”

Wherever there is negative advertising there is also a need to counter it. Sally Young writes in 2005 that “Aside from ‘It’s the economy stupid’, it’s less well known that Bill Clinton’s campaign team had another unofficial slogan in 1992: ‘Speed Kills’,” referring to the need to speed and flexibility to make response ads and get them on air quickly.

We saw a great example of this in 2007 during the federal election when Labor used a video image of Kevin Rudd turning off a TV attack ad which had been aired by the Liberals (the day before) with a remote control and then addressing the camera to deal with the allegations. The Liberals responded with a spoof of the Labor ad, showing Howard turn off the original Labor response ad. Comedians on the TV program “The Chaser” then stretched the concept to the limit, showing a continuous loop of people turning off each other’s TV ads with remotes.

Mills details one of the earliest instances of successful negative TV advertising during the 1980 federal election when “The Liberals broadcast one of the most negative television commercials of Australia’s political history, the famous ‘wealth tax’ advertisement which haunted middle Australia with the threat of new Labor taxes on home owning.” Despite “Bill Hayden’s Labor’s Opposition putting together the most disciplined research and communications campaign it had ever managed, one that was clearly better than the Government’s” and Hayden “regularly polling better than Malcolm Fraser”, Fraser was returned to office.

Lynton Crosby, in his post-1998-election analysis, explained that negative advertising is not meant to be liked or enjoyed “Political advertising is unique, a fact that the dozens of marketing and advertising experts who seem to be wheeled out to make commentary during and after a campaign do not seem to understand. Election advertising is not designed to be liked but rather to have an effect on people’s voting behaviour”

During the recent 2007 federal election, the Howard Government attacked Labor’s new leader Kevin Rudd repeatedly and also attacked the Labor brand using scare campaigns about ‘wall-to-wall Labor’, ‘Union bullies’ and Peter Garrett’s environmental policies, all to little effect. In her essay Exit Right. The unravelling of John Howard Judith Brett describes how Howard’s attacks on Rudd surprised even the visiting American pollster Frank Luntz, who described them as “the most blunt terminology I have ever seen a leader use”. Luntz joked that for every question journalists asked Howard, he found a way to criticise Rudd with the answer. “If someone asks him: Where’s the toilet? He answers: Exactly where Australia will be if Kevin Rudd becomes the Prime Minister”
Commentating on the recent CLP comeback in the Northern territory in August 2007, Senator Mark Arbib wrote “While some people think that wedge politics originated in the USA with the Republicans, it was the CLP who specialised in it much earlier: using law and order to drive a wedge between the local indigenous and white community. It’s a tactic that has helped them win many elections and almost got them home last Saturday.”

It is important to remember that the systemic differences between US and Australian elections result in different strategies being pursued by seemingly similar campaign techniques. Many US studies focus measurement of campaign effect by looking at voter turnout, which can be more easily measured than subjective statements about why people vote a certain way based on the effects of persuasive arguments and messages. It is often suggested that one of the electoral strategies in negative campaigning in the US is “voter suppression” or “turnout suppression”, where the content and volume of negative messages and materials dampens turnout. Gerber, Green and Green conducted randomised field experiments which “indicate partisan campaign mail does little to stimulate voter turnout and may even dampen it when the mail is negative in tone” As far as the author could find, no similar randomised studies exist about the effect in Australian elections. 31

During the 2006 US congressional elections the author witnessed first hand the results of a local Republican voter suppression strategy and techniques utilising robocalls targeted at Democrat voters in Philadelphia. One voter called to complain to the Democrat campaign after receiving three messages in four hours. Each pro-Republican call misleadingly began, “Hello, I’m calling with information about Lois Murphy…” and many were received late at night and early in the morning, designed to inconvenience and upset Democrat supporters who would hang up on the calls before hearing the Republican tag at the end. Many called the campaign office, mistakenly believing the calls were made by the Murphy campaign and disgusted that the Democrat campaign would harass voters in such a way.

There have been many reports about the long-term ill-effects of negative advertising on democracy and voter turnout, as well as explanations of why negative advertising is used. In Does negative advertising work? Harris and Kolovos list numerous marketing-based principals (such as differentiating candidates, memorable messaging, newsworthiness) as well as electoral effects (motivating your base and suppressing your opposition turnout). 114

Mills is adamant in his 1986 book that “largely American-derived marketing techniques” have changed Australian politics “beyond recognition” – but have they? Recent innovations since the 1970s have certainly made politics more professional and expensive but the fundamentals of political success remain the same, if not the technology that is used to help deliver a political message. One of his assertions seems premature (with the benefit of hindsight): “The old ways – stump speeches, town hall meetings, closely typed handbills (ok, he’s right on the money with that one) – have given way to computers and TV and public opinion polls and group discussions and phone polls and direct mail.”

Former ALP National Secretary Bob Hogg is critical of “sentimental arguments” decrying the end of town hall meetings, as well as suggestions that modern campaigns being “too presidential”. In his chapter Hawke the campaigner, from The Hawke government: a critical retrospective Hogg writes that “We have moved from hall and street meetings simply because people now rarely turn up. Decades ago such meetings in much smaller communities were a part of the mass communication of the times. They no longer are. Television and radio are the most effective ways to reach a mass audience.”

But have much of “the old ways” that Mills and Hogg refer to been replaced? Or has the form of mass communication changed to suit various candidates and campaign managers? The lead up to the 2004 federal election saw a revival of the “campaign bus” concept, itself borrowed from the campaign trains and buses of US political history. Although the final result of the Latham campaign bus was immersed in a wider political tragedy, the localised results were impressive, with 600-800 people cramming school halls and bowling clubs for a turn at the microphone and the Leader’s ear. The nightly news predictably focused on the one or two hecklers at each event, rather than the vast majority of participants who were enthusiastic participants in an “old style” unscripted town hall meeting.

2004 also saw the direct import of some email and sms spamming techniques from the US into Australia via Prime Minister John Howard’s son, who had spent some time working closely with US republicans in George Bush’s office. Julianne Stewart described how “Several Liberal MPs used Howard’s son’s Internet company to send email spam to their electorates” and were able to do so because “political and religious organisations are exempt from recent anti-spamming legislation in Australia.”

In the 2006 Queensland election both parties produced websites that, although far from cutting edge, indicated that the internet had become a permanent feature of Australian campaigns. Stephen Dann disparaged the Coalition website from a political marketing perspective explaining “Visually, technically and politically, this is a campaign website that needs five fab web designers and a makeover. The unspoken message from the site is a political campaign nightmare – the design is old, the reference to the PM makes it seem like qldcoalition.com isn’t really a state website, and placement of the policy link as the last on the page says volumes about the party’s priorities. None of this is probably intentional, but it’s all harmful to the political message. This site looks marginally better than you’d expect at Yahoo!Geocities but is definitely is getting beaten at any point in the web design spectrum by the TeamBeattie site.” Describing both sites “There are no revolutionary new media techniques, no adoption of the cutting edge, and that’s probably for the best. Political campaigning as we currently recognise it is incompatible with the open platform “spaces people use” approach of Web 2.0, and far more at home in the Web 1.0 “place you go” style. If you were looking for a revolution in Internet politics at the state level, you’ll have to wait for the next election.”

A few months later in early 2007, the NSW state election brought one new aspect to internet political campaigning – the humorous “jib-jab” style of cartoon singing parody. A Labor YouTube video cartoon and jingle “In the Liberals” made fun of Liberal Leader Peter Debnam, a former naval officer, to the tune of the famous Village People song In the navy. The video’s appearance on mainstream TV helped publicise the anti-Liberal YouTube website http://www.youtube.com/user/debnamrecord.

The humour of YouTube cannot work in isolation. The animation described above summarised the widely held opinion in the mass media that the opposition leader was not a serious contender. The image of him in his speedos came to define that assessment.

One of the unexpected effects of YouTube has been to revive interest and appreciation in some aspects of old-style campaigning, namely good speeches and quick-witted responses during debates and interviews. Within hours of an impressive candidate speech by presidential hopeful Barack Obama or a mistake by President George Bush, it appears on the web for all who care to see and make their own judgement.

In September 2007 the E-Voter institute in the US published an extensive report about the latest developments in Internet campaigning. It is important to look at because it identified several weaknesses in the trend to more online campaigning: voters prefer TV ads as a medium for information from candidates; internet tools are seen as effective for reaching liberal activists (but not conservatives); and online social networking sites a good for “creating a buzz” and “spreading a message” but not necessarily effective stimulants for traditional political activism.

It will be interesting to see if the research following this year’s presidential election bucks these trends, particularly as there have been many recent report that some traditional campaign activities (such as fundraising) are now done just as efficiently online as using traditional techniques (phone and mail).

The 2007 Australian federal election was often referred to as “the YouTube election” (as was the 2006 US mid-term election). Macnamara uses media content analysis to find the term was used no less than 19 times in the mainstream media in the three months prior to the election date. Some of the “new media” which is identified in E-Electioneering – Use of New Media in the 2007 Australian Federal Election includes: Political and election related Web sites including personal Web sites of political candidates; political party Web sites; and independent Web sites including http://www.federalelection.com.au;  http://www.google.com.au/election2007; http://www.electiontracker.net; http://www.Youdecide2007.org;  Senator On-Line (www.senatoronline.org.au); and GetUp (www.getup.org.au); Blogs of political candidates such as The Bartlett Diaries (www.andrewbartlett.com/blog)  and independent election-related blogs such as Crikey (www.crikey.com.au);  http://www.newmatilda.com and Possum Pollytics (www.possumcomitatus.wordpress.com); [author – he omits the popular mumble.com.au and Pollbludger.com.au]; Vlogs (video Web logs); MySpace sites (www.myspace.com); Facebook sites (www.facebook.com);  YouTube (www.youtube.com); Chat rooms and online forums; Wikis; E-newsletters (online or downloadable in PDF format); E-surveys (online surveys); and other online communication such as online petitions. Macnamara concludes that the effect of new media is still patchy as participation rates are still low, particularly compared to the US, with its higher use of broadband. He also concurs with a recent American study that “some level of digitally-enhanced democracy is occurring” but that the medium is still dominated by official channels.

McAllister and Gibson use figures from the 2007 Australian Election Study to demonstrate the growing importance of new web 2.0 technologies to the modern Australian campaign. From a professional campaign perspective, a randomised field study would be required to support their conclusions of the “significant electoral advantage that accrues to candidates who possess a personal website” however their findings about the turning point that has been reached with these new campaign tools is beyond question. The AES found that “voters themselves reported considerably more use of the internet to access election news than at any time in the past.” Although “the Internet is still far behind television as a source of election news”, “it is rapidly catching up with newspapers and radio.” McAllister and Gibson write how the Kevin07 website “became synonymous with the message of engagement, openness and progressive change that Labor and particularly their leader, sought to embody. Mirroring the efforts of the US presidential candidates, the pages contained numerous calls for voters to donate, volunteer, spread the word online and contribute to Kevin’s blog, as well as links through to his pages on MySpace, Facebook and an official YouTube video channel.

McAllister quotes a Chen and Walsh study which criticised politician’s websites for “low functionality, with basic search and feedback facilities existing on less than half of the sites examined”. Even though they conclude that the use of web campaigning has become more complex, there is no critique of poor political website or Internet practice in the McAllister and Gibson. Practitioners in 2007 and in previous elections are aware of many poor political websites which could possibly lose as many votes as they earn, so there is certainly more room for some case study analysis, combined with randomised sampling to try and measure the effect of different styles of web campaigning and focus on different functionality (video, policy information, still photos, biography, blogging, interactivity, etc.) affects electoral outcome. Practitioners (mostly MPs and their campaign teams) who don’t understand the statistical science behind McAllister’s study will predictably react with the notion that their conclusions about correlation are beyond dispute but that the causal links between web activity and electoral success are still in doubt due to the numerous local, candidate, national and state factors which may not have been considered in the statistics. The author witnessed such an exchange of ideas between an MP and McAllister and Gibson, during a discussion about their 2006 paper linking electoral success in the 2004 election and online campaigning, and the authors have since written “whether such conversion power can be attributed to the viewing of a website is clearly debatable”. With the benefit of hindsight, it’s clear that the disputed premise of their earlier study has in fact proven to be correct from a practitioner’s viewpoint, given the electoral benefits of the Kevin07 online campaign. But it is debatable which elements of the online campaign can be successfully replicated by individual MPs and parties in the future. The practitioners will always be primarily concerned with any electoral competitive advantage that can be gained from such analysis and where they cannot discern it, will revert to methods they believe are more effective.

Supporting views from Miskin, Bruns and Kissane add weight to the argument that one specific aspect of their online campaign, both party’s YouTube postings, were primarily targeted at journalists in the mainstream media, in a successful strategy to capture airtime on TV and online news sites “rather than “craft a message to suit the medium”.

Australian characters have also featured in American online campaigning discourse. In the lead up to the 2007 federal election, Prime Minister John Howard made a widely reported and unveiled attack on Barack Obama and the US Democrats when he described the US Presidential Primary contest and likely win by Barack Obama: “If I were running al Qaeda in Iraq, I would put a circle around March 2008, and pray, as many times as possible, for a victory not only for Obama, but also for the Democrats.” Obama, campaigning in Iowa, told reporters he was flattered that one of Bush’s allies “started attacking me the day after I announced (his presidential run) – I take that as a compliment.” The Democratic presidential hopeful said if the Australian Prime Minister was “ginned up to fight the good fight in Iraq,” he needs to send another 20,000 Australians to the war, “otherwise, it’s just a bunch of empty rhetoric.”

Within hours, US television networks were reporting the exchange and it was only a matter of time before comedians like Stephen Colbert on the Colbert Report (which humorously poses as a neo-conservative media show) joined in the fray when he let fly with a stereotype-laden retort that was widely distributed via YouTube:

“Bravo Prime Minister, or as they say in Australia, didgeridoo your mateship. (audience laughs) I guess now we know what those kangaroos are hiding in their pouches, (gestures with hands) kookaburra-sized balls (laughter). The conservative Howard knows that in this war you are either with us, or you’re a Democrat (laughter). Which brings me to my next wag of the finger, (pointing sternly at camera) to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, for slamming a citizen of the United States (laughter). Listen you sawed off wallaby, we know ‘fosters’ is Australian for ‘beer’ but what’s Australian for ‘shut your damned trap’? (laughter) Keep your shrimp-stained fingers off Barack Obama. (laughter) Leave the ad hominem attacks on him to Americans. Why don’t you go back to worrying about your little cane toad problem and the fact that your whole damned country’s descended from criminals? (laughter) Oh, and the next time you’re ‘Waltzing with Matilda’, you might want to check out her Adam’s apple, ‘cause she’s a dude! (Audience in uncontrollable laughter, while Colbert composes himself and shuffles papers together, adjust suit and glasses). That being said, I agree with everything he said.”

In many ways the new technologies have replaced more traditional forms of political entertainment that were once provided by Soap-box debates in forums such as Melbourne’s pubs or Sydney’s Domain.

Ian Ward wrote that the although both major parties in the 2007 election did develop a Web2.0 Internet campaign, neither major party engaged an online audience in their campaign in the way modern US campaigns do, or even the way the activist site GetUp has demonstrated is possible. The most watched YouTube political videos were not party ads, but satirical clips such as that produced by a Sydney law student depicting Kevin Rudd in the style of Mao Zedong in Chinese propaganda films, and take-offs of 80s music clips with lyrics that ridiculed John Howard.
Ward writes that “Labor’s pitch to the YouTube generation is one key to explaining the sizeable swing the ALP obtained on November 24. The key point to be made is not that Labor made effective use of Web2.0 to engage Generation YouTube, but that it was able to use its Kevin.07 website and Facebook, MySpace and YouTube to brand Rudd as a new generation leader with fresh ideas, and the ALP as the party of innovation. Relatively few Gen Y voters visited its website or downloaded its ads from Labor’s YouTube channel. Nonetheless Labor was able to employ its Internet presence as a marketing tool, to connect with younger voters more broadly, and to reverse the Liberals’ ascendancy amongst voters in the 18 to 34 age range.”

In an article describing the 2007 election debate about Industrial Relations, Diana Kelley wrote “Perhaps the most effective use of new media came through the progressivist and activist sites such as GetUp and, the ACTU directed Your Rights at Work. These offered opportunities not only to express ideas, debate and discuss issues, describe personal experiences, but most notably to be engaged in the election process, rather than as passive recipients of information.”

The most memorable (because they were the most entertaining) episodes of YouTube campaigning on the Internet were provided by highly engaged voters, operating without party instruction or affiliation. The best examples were from a 24 year old Sydney Law Student Hugh Atkin produced the now famous online “Chinese Propaganda Video” portraying Kevin Rudd as mandarin-speaking clone of Chairman Mao. So popular was this video that it was literally viewed by millions who saw it regularly rebroadcast on TV through shows like “Insiders”, “Sunrise” and various talk-shows. It was a great demonstration of the viral nature of humorous YouTube videos, especially the dramatic effect they can have if the virus leaps into another broadcast medium.

Another popular video was “John Howard 2007 Bennelong Time Since I Rock and Rolled” which was put together, along with many other anti-Howard online videos by a resident of Howard’s electorate of Bennelong, Stefan Sojka. Stefan’s experience as a creative director in a Sydney-based web design company meant he was armed and ready for the 2007 campaign and made the most of his creative humour and intimate knowledge of Howard and his policies to impress a growing online audience.

Macnamara describes how “most journalists and commentators reported that the ALP’s use of new media was more effective than the Liberal Party’s based on online feedback, viewer ratings, volumes of ‘friends’ and public discussion.”

It was frequently reported that the Kevin07 site followed the conventions of new media more closely and that Kevin Rudd was generally more comfortable and familiar with the protocols and etiquette of the Web. One journalist noted: “Launching his MySpace site in mid-July, [Kevin Rudd] deftly promised – in response to a teenager’s criticism that his website was ugly – that he was ‘having it pimped’” (Sydney Morning Herald, 17 November 2007). Another reported that: “John Howard’s foray into YouTube was a complete flop, provoking hundreds of ‘mashups’ satirical responses attacking the PM and his policies. ‘It was like vultures picking at a carcass. Howard failed because he didn’t understand the medium and its rules. He just plonked himself in YouTube without even an introduction,’ [digital marketing expert Julian] Cole says. Kevin Rudd is choosing to campaign with his Kevin07 website, which links to his pages on Facebook, MySpace and YouTube: innovative media choices that Mr Cole says add weight to the ALP leader’s ‘fresh ideas’ philosophy” (The Age, 25 October 2007). Australia’s leading media buyer Harold Mitchell observed that John Howard appeared uncomfortable in his use of new media.

Some of the best users of the new ICTs have been third party groups like Unions and GetUp! In an online article on Crikey, Andrew Hughes explains “the influence of stakeholder groups has long been an issue in Australian politics. Some stakeholder groups have direct influence on the formulation of not just party policy, but party administration, choice of candidates and campaigning. The union movement still exerts a tremendous influence on the Labor Party and there is no doubt that business groups such as the Business Council of Australia have a direct influence on the Liberal Party. Even the so called minor parties are not free from the influence of stakeholder groups – the Greens are influenced by the larger organisations in the conservation movement such as the ACF, the Nationals by the NFF and Family First by the new religious churches such as Hillsong. In its short three years of operation GetUp! has grown more rapidly than any other political organisation in Australian history with its simple product offering people everywhere to have a say on the issue of their choice. They know their power is their massive membership base, particularly in the critical 18-39 age middle class segment. Ask any consumer goods marketer and they’ll tell you that if you can crack this segment then you can nearly control the market. No surprise then that this is now the hottest segment to control in politics. Win this segment and you win elections. GetUp!, with so many of its members falling into this category, has suddenly won a lot of friends and learned how to influence people. If it fails to act impartially then GetUp! will notice that the 18-39 segment is also fickle and will leave it in droves. GetUp! and other stakeholder groups are a fixture of Australian politics whose true influence we are only now beginning to see.

The use of TV commercials which have a strategic role in convincing the media of a theme or message continues and has expanded to include new technologies such as YouTube. In 2007 both sides effectively utilised the news media’s interest in the campaign to promote their message.

Commercials that only had a short run on TV, or in some cases, only appeared on the Internet, even though they were referred to misleadingly as “TV advertisements” got more “airtime” via news reporting of the message rather than the paid advertisements themselves.

In 2007, the media widely reported that the Labor Party was utilising a new campaign technique introduced to Australia by the Liberals in 2004. Automatic phone messages, often referred to in the US as ‘robocalls’ were copied directly by the Liberals from the US Republican campaign handbook. It was reported earlier that one of Mr Howard’s sons had worked on the 2004 Bush/Cheney campaign in the US. In October 2004, the following phone message was sent by the Liberal party to homes across Australia:

“Hello this is John Howard. I’ve taken the unusual step of contacting you with this recorded message to support your local Liberal candidate for Bowman, Andrew Laming. As part of my Federal Liberal team, Andrew Lamming … I know Andrew Lamming and I know he will get things done for Bowman. This is John Howard on behalf of Andrew Lamming. Thank you for your time.”

Unfortunately the 2004 calls seemed to generate a large amount of negative feedback. Robocalls a widely used in the US for a variety of purposes. So widespread is there use (and misuse) that legislation exists in a number of states to limit their use. The legislation is hamstrung by the fractured and inconsistent nature of state-based laws in the US, thus providing as many loopholes as restrictions for candidates and campaign teams in the use of this new weapon. In 2004 in Australia the headlines reporting this new campaign method included “Liberal telephone calls anger voters” and “Liberal phone spam doesn’t ring true, say unhappy targets.” ABC reporter Karen Barlow described how “phone spamming” is “just one of the new ways that political parties around the world are bypassing the mainstream media.” The complaints lodged with the ACA at the time included the use of unlisted numbers and mobile numbers (which resulted in reports of voters being charged to retrieve the phone message).

There was also speculation, although no evidence is provided, that the Liberal Party connection to Acxiom may have been a useful source of the telephone data. Axciom is a US-based international direct marketing technology company which had (prior to his preselection for the federal seat of Goldstein) Liberal Andrew Robb as its Australian Director. Prior to running Axciom for the Packer organisation, Rob was Liberal Deputy Director, then he was opposition leader Andrew Peacock’s chief of staff, and, in 1990, Liberal federal director. In that job he ran the 1993 and 1996 federal election campaigns for the Liberal Party.

Acxiom in Australia, established in 1999, is “a wholly owned subsidiary of US-based Acxiom Corporation. Until April 2002, Publishing and Broadcasting Limited (PBL) owned 50%. PBL have retained a strategic interest in Acxiom Australia. For 33 years Acxiom Corporation has helped companies integrate and manage their internal customer data to increase marketing efficiency. Acxiom’s stock in trade includes merging customer data from disparate databases, mining this customer data, profiling customers to help companies target their marketing efforts and providing consumer and business data to assist in acquisition or retention strategies. With offices in Sydney, Melbourne and Auckland, Acxiom provides these services built for, or tailored to, the local marketing environment.”

In her post-election research paper for the Australian Parliamentary Library, Sarah Miskin wrote that Academics Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen had predicted in July 2004 that electronic phone messaging would be used in the federal election campaign, albeit in a limited way due to its ‘infancy’. She also wrote “Voter reaction to the pre-recorded message calls may have been more positive had the Prime Minister actually made the calls, as one reported comment revealed: At first I thought my God, the Prime Minister’s calling. But then—as soon as I realised it was a recorded message—I just hung up”. She was quoting from another critical article that appeared in the West Australian titled “Voters hang up on PM’s phone spam”

Although Miskin repeats claims made in newspapers by the Liberals “that the calls had helped the Coalition win as many as six seats” this could be interpreted as boastful speculation rather than empirical analysis by Liberal campaign managers. Liberal pollster Mark Textor was quoted in the Age saying that the calls would be used in future elections because they had been so effective: “people appreciated the fact that they got a direct and unfiltered message from a political leader in a new, effective way”.

Miskin writes that “at least one Liberal candidate in the ACT election (held on 16 October 2004) was reported to have opted for the strategy, ‘bombarding the home phones of 17,500 voters with pre-recorded campaign messages’ authorised by the Canberra Liberals’ divisional office”. There is no mention of the name of the candidate or if his/her tactic was successful.

Automatic phone messages were used again but in 2007 it seemed that the Liberals had not adapted their techniques or learnt from previous campaigns. Despite intrusive telemarketing calls becoming a real nuisance for many people, to the point where a ‘Do Not Call’ register had been developed by the Government in response to community anger, the Liberal campaign chose to ignore it. The Labor Party campaign headquarters received numerous complaints about Liberal party automatic phone messages from voters who, as in 2004, claimed that their numbers (including mobile numbers) were not listed publicly or, alternatively, were on the new Australian “Do Not Call Register”. These reports were passed on to and known to the media, who also received information from Labor’s campaign spokesperson Penny Wong, how the Labor Party’s automated phone message was more carefully targeted and the lists used by the Labor Party had specifically only used publicly listed numbers which were commercially available and specifically removed people who were on the new Australian “Do Not Call Register”. Unlike the Liberals, Labor had learnt the important lesson from 2004 about the political cost of annoying calls. Even though there was no legislative requirement, the Labor campaign had made the correct decision to carefully avoid calling people who had registered on the new Australian “Do Not Call Register” and also chose to remove any publicly listed mobile numbers from the telephone lists which it had purchased.

Although many complaints were received about them, the text of the Liberals’ 2007 calls indicated that a decision about targeting strategy had been made, if not implemented carefully:

“Hello, I’m John Howard. I’ve taken the unusual step of contacting you with this message to let you know about our fully funded nine point plan to keep our economy strong. It includes: A big boost to the utilities allowance, anew cost of living guarantee for pensioners and surveillance cameras to keep our streets safer. At a time of global financial instability we need to keep the economy strong, secure your retirement and pay for vital services. To keep our economy strong please vote for your local Liberal candidate Peter Slipper. I’m John Howard and thanks for your time.”

Robocalls are certainly part of the normal campaign routine in the US. A study by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center in April 2008 showed that recorded calls are moving ahead of mail and personal calls as an increasingly popular form of political advertising. In Iowa, where the presidential campaign season opened, the number of citizens who received at least one robocall was 81 percent.

In a recent newspaper article a US political consultant explained why the calls aren’t going away: “A direct mail piece now costs about 65 cents for every voter it reaches. Each live telephone call costs about 50 cents. But robocalls cost only about 6 cents each, with the price going down with volume.” While some of the calls are little more than a reminder to supporters to get out and vote, robocalls also can go on the attack. In Indiana in May, National Right to Life, an anti-abortion group, used robocalls to ask voters to reject Illinois Sen. Barack Obama in the state presidential primary. In South Carolina, New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton made her own robocalls to slam another presidential candidate, former North Carolina Sen. John Edwards. But the celebrity calls may be the most effective, Ross said, because studies show listeners stay on the call longer when it’s someone famous on the line. One consultant said “We did a call with Arnold Schwarzenegger and we found people staying on the line even after it was over, waiting to see if there was more.”

One of the new innovative uses of the internet by political parties in Australia is for secure campaign websites, or ‘Extranets’ to facilitate the distribution of campaign information and materials to state branches, MPs, candidates and local campaign teams. Peter van Onselen’s paper On Message or Out of Touch? Secure Web Sites and Political Campaigning in Australia takes a critical view that begins by confusing the terms ‘Intranet’ and ‘secure web sites’ (commonly referred to as extranet’s in ICT circles, as access is largely obtained via the common Internet and other external networks, rather than through a virtual private network or VPN connection). Van Onselen admits that Intranets are commonly used in the business sector as well as the public sector and yet sees this tool as another example of “what has been described in the US as the ‘permanent campaign’” rather than a natural evolutionary use of new technology for better internal (and by design, external) political communication. Instead van Onselen argues that Extranets signify “another important step in the ongoing centralisation of power in political campaigning in Australia” and asks if the new ICTs possibly even “shift parties further toward the closed or cartelised form?” These are very critical generalisations to make without analysing the role that extranets have in improving communication efficiencies in any large dispersed organisation. Van Onselen underlines his criticisms of the party Extranet system by explaining how it was used by Howard’s Government Members Secretariat (the GMS was disbanded by the new Rudd Government) to provide tax-payer funded campaign support and how secure websites are “uplifted [author note – should be ‘uploaded’] as much as one year before the formal campaign period”, thus “disadvantaging smaller parties”. Obvious exceptions to this thesis would be the three current lower house independents and Senator Nick Xenophon, who success has not been affected by Liberal or Labor Extranets.

Greg Barns writes extensively about the Hoard Government’s misuse of the GMS in his book Selling The Australian Government: Politics and Propaganda From Whitlam to Howard. He also explains the genesis from Hawke’s NMLS, Fraser’s GIU and Whitlam’s AGLS.

The GMS was only one aspect of the impressive professionalisation of staff and message which took place when Howard won in office in 1996. Anne Tiernan’s book Power Wwithout Rresponsibility? Mministerial sStaffers in Australian Ggovernments from Whitlam to Howard describes the Liberal Party’s internal post-1983 Valder Report, which recommended how it would improve its operations by employing and training better political staff once it won office again.

The Literature Review Part 3 – Campaign foundations: strategy, message, finance, research

Posted on

Campaign foundations: strategy, message, finance, research

Are basic political strategies in Australian politics and American politics similar in style and are campaigning techniques (from political strategy formulation to voter contact) and skills transferable between these two systems? The case against states there are big differences in our systems (differences in size, cultures and history, political structures, regulations and industries, wealth, academic influence and scholarly research) and some of our basic strategies are fundamentally incongruous (e.g. persuasion vs. voter turnout/suppression). The ‘Yes’ case states that the basics of electoral success are essentially the same: Understand your landscape, raise and spend more money than your opponent, test your message, campaign on local and personal issues, have credible, articulate and attractive candidates, repeat your message with clarity, simplicity and supporting evidence and endorsements, organise local support, alliances and activities which highlight your ‘strengths’ and ‘your issues’, utilise earned media effectively and complement it with paid advertising.

Central message control and dissemination is certainly not a new concept. Up until a few decades ago, the fashionable description was ‘propaganda’ but as O’Shaughnessy explains in Politics and propaganda: weapons of mass seduction, the term “faced conceptual extinction because it became an anachronism”. He asks rhetorically, “how could a cynical, media-literate cadre ever respond to (propaganda’s) histrionic excess as earlier, more naïve generations had done?” and then answers the question by explaining that effective propaganda is “seductive” and “not usually a lie” but in fact “persuasion”. O’Shaughnessy accurately describes the manner in which old political ideas and techniques often ‘become new again’ when he writes “ideas do not die, they merely hibernate” and “the whirligig of fashion applies to concepts as well as clothes.”

O’Shaughnessy’s historical dissection of the essential propaganda elements of “rhetoric, myth and symbolism” and the application of this model to modern political communication and persuasion techniques are expansive and applicable to many modern political contests (and worthy of a separate thesis).

Propaganda is clearly designed to affect voter behaviour. An ANU news article describes how marketing experts can provide sound theories to explain voting behaviour.

Writing in the Monash Business Review in 2008, Stephen Dann and Andrew Hughes outlined five lessons learnt from the election campaign, including: having a less confusing message, using better communication, reducing risk for voters, not taking votes for granted and successfully using celebrity candidates. Hughes said the Coalition’s campaign came unstuck before it had even begun, and that the party should have listened to what their research was telling them. “The Coalition marketing campaign was just terrible – they got it so wrong. It started badly, continued badly and finished badly,” he says. “The marketing research the Coalition had was ignored when it should have been listened to. Opinion polls are great market research, and if the Coalition had acted on what those polls told them they could have stayed in government. But the marketing people should have told Howard it was time to go.” Hughes says there were plenty of opportunities for the Coalition to alter the course of the campaign but time and again these were missed.

The marketing research which Hughes refers to Federal State of Play – Oztrack 33, presented by Mark Textor on 21 June 2007, was actually leaked during the 2007 election and was widely available online for a short period of time, until the Liberal Party pollsters Crosby Textor threatened legal action against the websites hosting and distributing the files. The research document begins with an explanation of ‘regression analysis’ a term and technique commonplace in market research and political microtargeting, which will be discussed later. The contents of the research are very revealing of the concerns that were being expressed within the inner circles of the Liberal campaign team in 2007. The document reveals the weaknesses of the Liberal brand but also suggests a strategy to counter Rudd and Labor by “comparing team strengths and highlighting Rudd’s inexperience and influences (unions, left factions and State Premiers).”

A post 2007 election article Me-tooism Claims Backfired On The Coalition quotes Andrew Hughes and reveals the strategic error in Liberal accusations of “me-tooism” and how they boosted Mr Rudd’s chances last year.

“The Liberals inadvertently enhanced the ALP when they continued to allow Rudd to be positioned as ‘John Howard Lite’. In marketing terms, the comparison of Rudd as ‘Howard Lite’ produced a dual positive effect for the Labor leader. First, the endorsement reduced the risk of switching from Howard to Rudd … Second, closing the gap between the two leaders reduced the options for the Liberal campaign to criticise Rudd without it impacting on their own leader’s reputation.” The Labor leader added his own gloss to policies, according to Mr Hughes. “Rudd may have been saying ‘me too’, but he was also saying, ‘I’ve taken their policy and made it a bit better’. Coming from Rudd, it looked a lot better than coming from Howard. Rudd as a brand was fresh, new and keen.”

The 2008 US presidential election analysis includes many political marketing stories, with frequent references to “brand” and “marketing” and “selling”. In an online article titled The Brand Called Obama, Ellen McGirt writes

“Obama and Clinton make an interesting contrast in brands,” says Professor John Quelch, Senior Associate Dean at Harvard Business School and co-author of Greater Good: How Good Marketing Makes for Better Democracy. “Obama communicates that he loves people, and Clinton communicates that she loves policy.” Consider Starbucks, Quelch says. “People love it for the experience, not for the specifications of the coffee.” Obama, through his inclusive Web site and, yes, his lofty rhetoric, reinforces the notion that everyone is included and that this movement is actually a conversation to which everyone is invited.

There is clearly a firm belief in the powers of marketing principals in US politics that has certainly had strong influence on Australian politics but has not been adopted as wholeheartedly by either our practitioners or those who study and write about their activities. Perhaps the academic disconnect between political science and marketing in most Australian universities has influenced the penetration of marketing viewpoints in Australian political science? Some of the marketing principles that Mills wrote about 20 years ago are still utilised by practitioners, such as the links between strategy, message design and research.

Although it didn’t help John Howard, the Crosby Textor research Federal State of Play – Oztrack 33 is a recent example of “tracking and targeting” of messages and advertising during election campaigns. This was first done during an Australian election in 1968. Mills describes how in Don Dunstan’s replacement of FH Walsh as Premier of South Australia in 1968, following a “party room coup”, gave a striking example of how incumbents can use “tracking and targeting” to advantage. Mills uses excerpts from Blewett and Jaensch’s Playford to Dunstan: the politics of transition and describes the “brilliantly successful campaign which saw the first Australian use by an incumbent of modern market research, and of a long-term American-inspired TV advertising effort built around the personality of the leader himself.”

Young writes that “central campaign control and decision-making was a product of modern campaign techniques.” Although 1972 saw the centralisation of strategy, message and planning in the famous “It’s Time” campaign for the ALP, in 1972 the Liberals were still leaving their advertising and publicity to the various state branches of the Party. “There was no cohesion or central planning. In contrast Labor used a full-time campaign director and national campaign structure.” The success of Labor’s approach “prompted the Liberals to use a central advertising agency and national campaign committee the following year.”

In the chapter Timely vibrations: Labor’s marketing campaign from the book Labor to power: Australia’s 1972 election, Vicky Braund writes that Paul Jones, the “communicator” or ad agent who designed “It’s Time”, was a “McLuhan disciple”. Marshall McLuhan is a famous American writer and media theorist who said “the medium is the message”. She describes how Labor was using people who understood the dramatic effect which TV advertising could have on voter perceptions, where “people make emotional, not rational decisions and that these decisions can be influenced to varying degrees by the judicious use of media”.

Stockwell’s 2005 conference paper Grazing The Field: Voter Uses Of The Media In Election Campaigns underlines the importance of centrally-coordinated campaigns which can repeat messages in various formats, more effectively reminding voters of a central theme or message. Knowing voters use various mediums allows political campaigners to utilise “a variety of information sources to deliver messages which are uncorrupted by the media”.

But sometimes, the best laid plans and intentions, and adaptation of proven methods, is undermined by circumstances beyond the candidate’s control. If the message is not resonating or the strategy is flawed, no amount of money or innovation will assist a campaign that has lost popular support.

Shane Easson, Executive officer to the NSW Premier in 1988 describes US literature on campaign techniques as one of the factors in Labor’s attempts to portray Unsworth as being in touch with common voters by travelling around to different electorates in a mini-bus during the 1988 campaign. Milton Cockburn, political editor in the Sydney Morning Herald at the time, described it as “the Harry S Truman strategy of being the ‘Plain Man’s Politician’”. Easson said “I have to confess that the day I joined Unsworth in September 1986 I gave him a book called the ‘Loneliest Campaign’ on Truman’s 1948 US election. He carried it with him until election night and then threw it in a corner.”

Both teams were trying to utilise American presidential campaign strategies. Ian Kortlang, Easson’s counterpart in the Liberal campaign in 1988 stated “We made a conscious decision to run Greiner’s campaign on a Presidential basis, and when Barry got into the bus it emphasised that even more…. You chose the low ground and we consciously chose the higher ground. We always had Greiner standing back from the media behind a lectern.”

Mills describes the political strategy of “tracking and targeting” as “innovations of polling and TV advertising” (which he identifies as American-derived influences) working “hand in hand” in a “synergistic relationship”. He explains “Tracking” is the “use of public opinion polls and other research methods to monitor changing attitudes in the population” and “targeting” as the “use of TV advertisements to aim political messages at electorally strategic parts of the population”.

Modern day political targeting involves a variety of campaign techniques, not just TV advertising. Recent Australian campaigns have targeted people using a variety of techniques including direct mail, phoning, doorknocking, Internet banner ads and robocalls. In fact, not “targeting” any campaign technique seems to run counter to much of the latest information and advice available to professional political campaigners. Mills explain how demographic data can be used to assist targeting, how the “electoral pendulum” defines the key electorates “which must fall if the Opposition is to form the next Government” and how “Parties in Australia focus their efforts on appealing to the swinging or undecided voters within these electorates.”

“Market research plumbs the depth of voter’s fears, perceptions and enthusiasms; television, a more emotive medium than cold, hard print, perfectly projects a personality-oriented, value-laden style of campaigning. In the lead-up to the 1984 elections both major Australian Parties tracked and targeted their campaigns. The Liberal Party conducted a highly disciplined campaign of tracking and targeting. The Liberal research revealed chinks in the otherwise strong government image: fears amongst some sections of the community about possible new taxes by the Hawke Government…. Targeting their advertisements to the sections of the community which research had revealed were most concerned about the tax fears…. It was a focused, targeted appeal which was drawn out over several months before the election began, beginning with a mini-campaign.”

This adoption and utilisation of research and targeting haahs become more widespread and has also been exported from Australia as left-leaning governments wax and wane across the globe, sharing ideas with each other as they aspire to government from opposition. There exists scholarly research pointing to Australian influences in modern political strategy, policy formulation and messaging in the UK and the US in the 1980s.

In The New Progressive Dilemma: Australia and Tony Blair’s Legacy, David O’Reilly describes “in its formative stages Blairism cherry-picked ideas far and wide”, including from Australia in the 1980s and early 1990s. In a critical analysis of Blairism, O’Reilly also predicts “a disturbing warning” that the same fate awaits UK Labour that the ALP suffered following its defeat in 1996. O’Reilly’s account focuses on the Australian influences of Blair’s (and Bill Clinton’s) famous “Third Way”, but also points to important campaign influences, such as the choice of more marketable leaders by the party hierarchy and visits to Australia (to look at the Hawke-Keating experience) by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, John Prescott, Patricia Hewitt and Phillip Gould. O’Reilly notes that due to the timing of the election cycles, “The Blairites looked to Australia first, before Clinton was even a ‘New Democrat’. Australia represented a first-phase influence, the US a second.”

O’Reilly describes the strategic outlook of “a corps of party officials and leaders” in Australia in the 1980s “and in Britain and the US later in that decade”, who were determined to “jettison any policies as well as practices, deemed to be creating obstacles to electoral victory” and “this was all part of a conscious act of strategic repositioning.”

“to keep their opponents off-balance … Labor modernisers in Australia and Britain employed for the first time cadres of tough apparatchiks whose new expertise was tough-minded, opinion-poll-driven electioneering logistics and media manipulation.”

In 1989 the newly set up US Democratic Leadership Council commissioned a study by Seymour Martin Lipset of left-of-centre parties around the world. Lipset’s study ‘Political Renewal on the Left’ held up Australia as one of the most advanced nations fomenting new ideas, lauding the Hawke-Keating economic and social model. O’Reilly describes how the Lipset study instigated a series of regular exchanges between the DLC, federal and state ALP branches and Hawke-Keating government ministers and staff “keen to talk both about skills-set politics [campaigning] and specific policy reforms”.

O’Reilly also describes an interesting 1987 interview with Gary Gray and British MP Patricia Hewitt (who was Australian-born) in which both confirm the superiority of the ALP’s campaign practices and utilisation of central campaign management, strategy and technology to assist local MPs. Hewitt says “the ALP was streets ahead of us” and “using stuff that we hadn’t even woke up to”. O’Reilly also describes an encounter between Blair and Keating in which Blair admires the “internal discipline” of Keating’s “powerful ALP right-wing faction in NSW” and dinners and meetings between Blair, Brown, Keating Government Ministers and ALP officials during which they discussed “policy development” and “campaigning”.

These exchanges continued and in 1996 UK Labour directly adopted the Australian model of a campaign media unit, based on the NMLS unit operating in the Keating Government. UK Labour also sent a party official to work at, observe and learn from the ALP federal election campaign, a practice that has been repeated frequently since then.

Another similar study by Chris Pierson Australian Antecedents of the Third Way (again focusing on policy development but occasionally illustrating interest in the exchange of electoral marketing ideas and techniques) shows “there are many common themes in Australian Labor practice and New Labour rhetoric, and some evidence of specific policy transfer from one to the other, a plausible case can also be made for seeing many of the policy initiatives of the Hawke/Keating era as a reworking of an older Australian Labor tradition of regulatory state activism,” indicating evolving Australian political messages and techniques having an overseas influence in the UK, rather than straightforward adoption of American influences here.

Pierson also describes how visiting British Labour Party elites “were principally interested in the electoral strategy (and success) of the ALP – especially after its triumph in the seemingly ‘unwinnable’ election of 1993. In part, this success was attributed to vote-getting policies but at least as much it was seen to be down to skilful and highly disciplined party organisation. In particular, Gary Gray had been extraordinarily effective in concentrating resources upon key seats and delivering a better than anticipated national outcome by ‘over-performing’ in Labor’s target seats.” UK Labour MP Patricia Hewitt reported that lessons from the Australian experience “had a significant impact upon Philip Gould, Labour’s own emergent electioneering guru” and “when Blair visited Australia in 1995, he was repeatedly asked what lessons he drew from the success of Australian Labor. Always at the top of his list was the ALP’s capacity to win elections and retain office”.

In their book Political Marketing: A Comparative Perspective Lilleker and Lees-Marshment argue that of the three models for modern political parties, the “market-orientated party”, with it’s more advanced intelligence-gathering techniques, will be most successful as it’s “product” will be appropriately adjusted to maximise electoral support. The 1997 landslide electoral success of the UK Labour Party is used as evidence of the wisdom of the “MOP” approach, after which “a consensus in favour of the MOP approach has emerged within the two major parties.” This study is interesting from the point of view of “New Labour” and “New Democrat” influences on Australian politics (and vice versa) as well as the (now outdated) debate surrounding the “third Way” which seems to have reached it’s peak in Australia during Mark Latham’s brief leadership. The authors highlight clear weaknesses in the MOP model and although comparisons are made with American, New Zealand, Canadian and European democracies, I haven’t been able to find any Australian references, although the language and techniques (and limitations of political marketing) used are similar to those described by Australian writers.

One could argue that one of the important lessons from the ALP for the UK labour Party was the importance of matching policy with electoral appeal, through the use of effective “frames” to describe and define policy positions and issues in electorally appealing ways. “Framing” is an essential consideration in political messages and political advertising and communications materials. There are several very influential texts on the subject available to US (and Australian) practitioners. These include George Lakoff’s Don’t Think Of An Elephant (Know Your Values And Frame The Debate) and Thinking Points, as well as Framing The Debate by Jeffrey Feldman.

There are few Australian equivalents but these texts, particularly Lakoff, have had an impact in Australia, most notably within the leadership of the Australian Union movement. The ACTU’s YRAW campaign, with its potent message and imagery, is a great example of a ‘positive frame’ for an issue that has very commonly been portrayed in a negative light in recent times.

In an article about the ‘Industrial Relations Frame’ in the 2007 election, Diane Kelly outlined the common US perspective, quoting a book Framed! Labor And The Corporate Media” by Christopher Martin (2004), she lists five negative frames used against unions in the US and writes “These assumptions offer ways of investigating and analysing the framing of coverage of industrial relations in the 2007 Australian election…. These five assumptions underpinned much of the framing of debates in the 2007 election, and indeed much of the representation of industrial relations, particularly in the conservative media.”

One aspect of strategic issue and message management that hasn’t had much coverage in Australia is the process of “priming” whereby media coverage about favourable issues or policies benefits certain candidates as voters begin to think about those issues more and which candidates support or oppose their viewpoint. In Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image Druckman concludes that priming strategies are “tailored” by “public opinion” and “strategic opportunities offered by the political conditions of their time.” Examples of issue priming in Australian politics is the use of economy and interest rate discussions by Liberals to focus voter’s minds on “economic management” or alternatively, using negative stories about unions to paint Labor in a bad light and remind voters about Labor’s close association with unions.

Although there is little written about it, figures and discussion about Australian campaign finance and fundraising eventually see the light of day, due to public disclosure laws, which on the surface, seem more restrictive but at the same time less effective than Australian regulations. In 1972 there was a strategic shift in the professionalisation of Australian federal campaigns with Labor’s ‘It’s Time’ campaign. In 1969, the ALP’s campaign budget had been $50,000. In 1972 it was more than $700,000.

The expansion of expenditure for campaigning drove more innovation in fundraising efforts and approaches to corporates who had not previously donated to the ALP. The 2007 federal election campaign saw massive online fundraising efforts by many groups and parties, in particular the ACTU and GetUp!, who utilised the ground-breaking models from the 2004 US presidential elections and more recent experience by unions and organisations like MoveOn in the US, to expand the use and effectiveness of online fundraising in Australian politics.

Gallop had revolutionised political polling in the US through the use of random sampling to predict the re-election of President Roosevelt in 1936. His published polls were syndicated across the US and sprouted several copycats who adopted his methods.

In The New Machine Men: Polls and Persuasion in Australian Politics Stephen Mills describes the first big American-derived innovation in the Australian political process when “immediately before the start of the Second World War, a young finance journalist with the Melbourne Herald (part of the Murdoch empire) was sent to Princeton, New Jersey, to learn from Dr George Gallup his new and apparently accurate theories of public opinion polling. On his return, Roy Morgan set up an Australian polling organisation modelled closely on Gallop’s methods for which 30 years provided the sole measure of Australian public opinion.”

By 1972 there were three big pollsters in Australia, all interpreting public opinion for major news organisations. Mills reports that “as many as five national pollsters competed to predict the results of Federal elections in 1980 and 1984”.

Although television arrived in Australia just in time for the 1958 federal election it was not creatively utilised until a few years later, after the US adaption of corporate market research techniques and advertising to politics had begun. Mills writes that in 1966 one of the first political surveys in Australia was “conducted by a group of Melbourne advertising agents for the Victorian ALP.” Then in 1968 the ALP’s campaign for Don Dunstan in South Australia broke new ground for political campaign innovation in Australia.

In Playford to Dunstan, Neal Blewett and Dean Jaensch write how in June 1967, only four weeks after becoming premier, Dunstan began a series of conferences, held mostly in Sydney, between his aides and the Labor advertising firm of Hansen-Rubensohn-McCann Erikson during which “the overall strategy of Labor’s electoral campaign was determined.” One of several important decisions made at these meetings was that “a survey of public attitudes should be undertaken as soon as possible to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the ALP in South Australia, the survey to provide a basis for Labor’s campaign emphasis.”

Gallops early competitors included Rod Cameron’s Australian National Opinion Polls (ANOP), which became Labor’s preferred pollster for many years. Mills describes how a series of research papers by ANOP for the ALP in 1979 helped reshape the Party’s outlook and fundamentally shifted it towards (eventual) electoral victory in 1982. The foundation of this breakthrough analysis was a defining portrait of “the swinging voter” that sounds strangely familiar to political readers of the 2007 federal election:

“Politics is dull, boring and largely irrelevant to their lifestyle. Politicians are held in low esteem. Politics is ‘out of touch’ with their interests and lifestyles… There is far greater involvement and interest in matters concerning their personal and their family’s financial well-being and their day-to-day interests (sport, family concerns, leisure, recreation) than in even simple questions of ideology and government.”

Mills explains “the swinging voter was typically a 30-40 year old parent (usually mother) of a young family, residing literally in the middle of all demographic categories, with a middle-class, middle-suburban, middle-education, middle-income, middle employment lifestyle and middle-of-the-road politics.”

Mills explains the electoral and policy significance of Cameron’s swinging voter portrait was that “the Whitlam days of ALP sponsorship of plans for vast social reform had indeed gone. This was not because of any sense that the programs had failed, or were irresponsible, or contravened some philosophy about the proper role of government. It was because they were disliked and ignored by the swinging voters.”

Various views about the ‘typical swinging voter’ have resurfaced in campaigning conventional wisdom over the past 30 years. Mills reports that at the same time the Liberal pollster George Camakaris was developing and presenting identical views to the Liberal Party about the attitudes and self-interest of swinging voters. There was a further twist, again with echoes (or predictions?) of Labor’s campaign for a return to government in 2007. In 1980, Rod Cameron was telling the Labor party that “it should not just move into the centre, but should do so knowing that its Liberal opponents were already firmly encamped there. The ALP should explicitly ‘me-too’ the Liberals!”

Similar political campaign techniques were being used in other democracies. In the UK, Margaret Thatchers victory in 1979 and second election in 1983, were both managed with the use of political marketing and careful tailoring of her manifesto. In a chapter titled “the Americanisation of British Politics” Margaret Scammel states in Designer politics: how elections are won that “Thatcherism was “more a style of leadership” than an “ideology”, finding a careful balance ‘between the political aims of the Prime Minister and her party and the tolerance of the electorate”.

One big difference between US and Australian politics is our leader’s habit to call elections after assessing the latest research poll. This happens in the UK as well as is documented in Dennis Kavanagh’s Election campaigning: the new marketing of politics where he describes how “it was only when large private surveys confirmed the handsome Tory lead in the public polls that Thatcher was prepared to call elections in 1983 and 1987.”

Australians have not only used political research techniques adapted from the US, but also sought to replicate specific demographic descriptions and target groups. In her book The Victory, Pamela Williams describes how Liberal Party director Andrew Robb had commissioned specific research in the lead-up to the 1996 federal election to ascertain whether “Australia had its own version of the Reagan Democrats, classic Labor voters sufficiently disillusioned to switch sides. He hoped the pollster’s findings would support his hunch. If Labor’s core supporters were wavering the Liberals could devise a strategy to woo them.”

Many of the political research techniques used in Australia have been learnt and refined in the US or through associations that have direct links with US companies and research organisations. The Liberal pollster, Mark Textor, is described in Parties, governments and pollsters: A new form of patronage? by Ian Ward: “Mark Textor is now the principal of Australasian Research Strategies Pty Ltd, which is part of the Wirthlin Worldwide group founded by the US Republican-linked pollster Richard Wirthlin. After graduating from the Australian National University and working for the Australian Bureau of Statistics doing household expenditure surveys, Textor returned to the Northern Territory to work for the Country Liberal Party. In 1991 he was recruited to the Federal Liberal secretariat where he worked under the tutelage of the then Federal Director, Andrew Robb.”

“Robb sent Textor to the United States after the 1993 federal election. There he worked with the Wirthlin Group on Republican gubernatorial and congressional campaigns in South Dakota, Nevada, South Carolina, New Jersey, Texas and California during a ‘two month stint on the Republican campaign in the US during 1994’. With the experience that he had gained in the United States, Textor became a key figure in the Liberals’ 1996 federal election ‘war room’ (the same year in which he also worked on the British Conservative Party campaign). With his guidance, the Liberals succeeded during the 1996 campaign in overturning the ‘decisive edge in technique’ that Labor had held ‘throughout the 1980s and early 1990s’. In 1998 the Liberals again employed Textor, this time as a consultant, to interpret opinion data, guide electoral strategy, and to secure the re-election of the Federal Coalition government. As in the 1996 campaign, his role was to distil the results of ‘overnight telephone polling’ gathered in 30 key marginal seats and provide the party with ‘strategic recommendations’. “By the late 1990s Textor had indeed emerged as a key Liberal operative. NSW Liberal State Director Remo Nogarrotto said that Textor is ‘a great asset and a person who provides this Party with a significant competitive advantage over Labor’. Textor’s reputation as the ‘doyen of Liberal Party polling’ survived his central involvement in the Liberals’ unsuccessful 1999 NSW State campaign. His reputation as the pollster who ‘regularly polls for John Howard on what messages hit which targets’”.

When he became Federal Director of the Liberal Party, Andrew Robb “spent a month in the US meeting successful political consultants and listening to their recollections of past election campaigns.” On his return to Australia, “he recruited a 34-year old Republican named Bruce Blakeman with 78 campaigns of all descriptions under his belt and experience in applying the latest marginal seat tactics.”

In a chapter titled “The manipulators – leveraging doubt and fear” in his book The Hollow Men, Nicky Hager writes about how the New Zealand Nationals used Crosby/Textor in the 2005 election. The references are very critical of the negative campaign techniques which the pair became known for, as well as their association with American tobacco and their ruthless use of research to tap into fear and apprehension in voters both in Australia and in the UK. Hager writes about the work Textor did for the Wirthlin Group, tobacco giant Philip Morris and British American Tobacco. He also quotes extensively from leaked internal National Party emails that describe how Crosby/Textor have utilised research to “frame” messages that appeal to voter’s fears and prejudices.

Hager also refers to previous “framing” strategies which conservatives in both New Zealand and Australia have borrowed from the US, such the use of the banner “political correctness” in the 1990s to “cut welfare programs for minorities, reduce environmental protections and attack civil liberties.”

In an online article about his new film (based on his now infamous book) Nicky Hager describes how Crosby/Textor are “the market leaders” in “deceptive, secretive and manipulative” party tactics. Hager refers critically to their numerous recent efforts in elections in New Zealand (2005 and 2008), Australia (various state and federal elections since 1990s) and the UK (2005 and London Mayor in 2008). He describes the three key steps or tactics that Crosby/Textor have employed in recent campaigns as 1) candidate/message discipline/control 2) Overtly personal attacks (often referred to as ‘dog whistling’ in Australian media and 3) Issue management – campaigning on issues that your opponent has no control over.

First, Crosby and Textor realised there was a high risk of Johnson tripping up and making mistakes compared with his experienced opponent. Their answer was to tightly control and script all Johnson’s public appearances. Two experienced public relations specialists oversaw him continually, declining interviews that didn’t suit their strategies and strictly keeping Johnson “on message”. Crosby/Textor call this “message discipline”, meaning a politician sticking to prepared lines no matter what the question or occasion lines that are mostly written by others. As a result, journalists saw only “the constrained, on-message Johnson”, the Sydney Morning Herald reported. An insider concluded that by scripting all his lines, controlling all his appearances and avoiding challenging interviews, Crosby/Textor “stopped Boris being Boris … and it worked.” The second strand of the London mayoralty strategy was relentlessly attacking Livingstone’s reputation. He had introduced some innovative and popular policies, so they concentrated on personal attacks. News stories appeared (never directly from Johnson) claiming Livingstone had three “secret children” and that he’d hired a Muslim extremist in his office. The major newspapers did not run such stories but giveaway tabloids did. The third strand was “issue management”. They found Livingstone had support on environment, social services and other issues. So instead they ran a narrowly focussed campaign on the rising cost of living and public safety even where these were the result of forces beyond Livingstone’s control.

In the introduction to his thesis Marketing, Media, Money and America Paul Zagami describes the infamous case of CLP “polling” in the 1994 Northern Territory election. Callers asked voters in 3 marginal seats “whether they would vote for the ALP candidate contesting the election if they knew the candidate had been involved in a bankrupt business”. Both the CLP and their pollster Mark Textor denied all accusations of involvement and “without the cooperation of the WA phone company used to make the calls the ALP was unable to substantiate its claims.”

There is of course evidence that most Australian campaign strategies and techniques are largely derived from home grown sources and not always copied from US sources. The concept of a “mini-campaign” or “dress rehearsal” is a universal one. In 1987 the NSW State Liberals ran a “We’re Ready” campaign to showcase the Greiner team’s credentials prior to the election (which eventually happened in March 1988).

Greiner’s strategy reveals the emergence of the ‘permanent campaign’ or ‘continuous campaign’ on the Australian political scene, a concept which was well recorded in American politics. In Shock Troops: The emerging role of Senators in House of Representatives Campaigns Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen describe how two features of Australian federal parliaments make them well suited to the use of permanent campaign strategies by incumbent governments: unfixed electoral terms and half the senators do not face re-election and are therefore available to assist in political activities anywhere in their home state.

In 1982, Sidney Blumenthal wrote The Permanent Campaign. In 2000, Ornstein and Mann co-opted that earlier title and edited The Permanent Campaign and Its Future. In that book they write “The line between campaigning and governing has all but disappeared, with campaigning increasingly dominant” and one of the causes is “the constraints of news as entertainment create the need for shorter sound bytes and confrontational angles, which turns governing into campaigning”. Their book also describes upsides to the “permanent campaign”, including increased scrutiny and accountability because political activities are reported more often and voters become more aware of what governments and oppositions do.

Greiner’s team new that the scrutiny of a public campaign event would help them get their act together. Ian Kortlang was the Greiner’s principal Private Secretary and a key strategist. When asked why he did a dress rehearsal he answered “… in fact we weren’t anywhere near ready.” After numerous straight election losses across mainland Australia the Liberal machine “had no successes to draw on, there was no standard operational procedure to say “this is the way we do it”.

Kortlang drew on his background as a diplomat and experience in the Army, where “nobody runs anything without having a dress rehearsal”, to organise a rehearsal of the Leader’s tour of marginal electorates as well as the campaign launch. The dress rehearsal allowed the Liberals to test the readiness of their organisation and candidates as well as to make mistakes and learn from them before the actual campaign. There were other benefits as well, which the then General Secretary of the NSW ALP Stephen Loosley acknowledged “It was intelligent politics for the Liberals to create a campaign event-if you create an event in politics, it will always have spin-off value and it will always give you a bit more momentum.” Loosley also states that “We did the same thing at Bankstown at the end of 1987 when we created the idea of a campaign convention. We brought all our people under one roof and gave them sessions on different aspects of advanced campaigning.”

By 1988 both parties in NSW were using research to test all advertising. The Liberal TV ads which appeared during their ‘We’re ready dress rehearsal’ prior to the 1988 election were tested by the ALP. Stephen Loosley describes how “… the commercial succeeded. We actually tested it in research groups and it did have one problem… (a weakness in the Liberal message) … which we used in our own material”. After watching Labor’s “Barrie Unsworth – he’s good value” TV ads, the Liberals’ focus group reports read “the advertising goes too far in attempting to portray Mr Unsworth favourably. Swinging voters see right through it. We doubt if the continued airplay of this advertising will impact greatly on perceptions of Mr Unsworth.”

No doubt the Liberal Party used similar research and focus group techniques to decide that in 2007 its government-funded Work Choices TV ads were becoming unpopular and that they were in fact backfiring because they were not as effective as the ACTU YRAW ads as well as the numerous testimonial stories in the media of victims of the government’s work laws and subsequently the ads were pulled off the air.

Research can help shape Australian Government decisions. Peter Thompson compered the ABC’s current affairs program AM in 1988 and described how ALP research into the Government’s standing brought about the demotion and eventual resignation of a senior minister, Laurie Brereton, adding to the Unsworth Government’s problems at the time. Stephen Loosley explained “During 1987 we tested a whole range of Ministers to see who we would use to support the Premier in the campaign. In one survey Laurie’s ratings were really quite damaging, not only to the Government but to him personally. I don’t think he saw it in that light at the time, but a approval/disapproval rating of minus 58 in two urban electorates is just devastating… Barrie decided to reshuffle the front bench and Laurie decided to resign.” Loosley recounts other factors in the decision to demote Brereton but states that “the research was just another justification”.

Mungo MacCallum describes an example of research-driven messaging in his book Poll Ddancing. The Story Of The 2007 Election. When Howard desperately “seizes on figures” which show a slightly higher number of people thought ‘wall to wall’ Labor governments would be a bad thing. 89 p 83

Zagami describes the “funnel phenomenon of party-voter communication as almost all information from the electorate passes through the narrow filter of the pollster before it reaches party elites. In turn this has removed the need and desire for the politician to get information from the public via face to face contact or though the party membership.” Again this unfortunately reveals the practical campaign inexperience of Zagami and others who approach political marketing from a purely academic perspective. Although it is not well documented outside of the parties in Australia, the foundation of good local intelligence for any politician is via direct voter contact, rather than through opinion polls and focus groups. The campaign manuals that will be dissected later in this thesis describe how to do this as a local representative as well as an aspiring candidate. In the conventional wisdom and personal experience of the author, the nature of “nuts and bolts” local campaigning techniques such as doorknocking, phone canvassing, public meetings, community events and local media events generates a lot of direct communication between MPs and their constituents and third parties within the electorate – none of which is usually filtered by polling or research experts. Even American professional political consulting proponents of microtargeting, direct mail, online campaigning and robocalls and other forms of modern campaign techniques, concede that the single most effective method for voter persuasion is through direct voter contact, as face-to-face communication is the single best method of human communication. The nature of polling and research methods such as focus groups is that they can provide retrospective snapshots of public opinion and insight but the expense of organising them and the time constraints involved in modern campaign requires a reliance on accumulated local intelligence as well as such subjective skills as “local knowledge” and “gut instincts” to develop and refine local strategies and messages. Formal research techniques can then be used, if time and money permit, to test and confirm strategies and messages and perhaps, if they are done well by experts, refine them in small ways.

Public discussions around polling and research tend to revolve around “horse race” commentary and predictions about wins and losses. Occasionally, journalists delve into the accuracy and inaccuracy of various polls and pollsters. Some journalists (e.g. Antony Green) are more educated about politics than others both here and in the US and these discussions wax and wane with election cycles and are occasionally resurgent around regular public polls such as the fortnightly Newspoll in the Australian. Similar examples exist in the US and the unique Australian nature of local discussions usually points to the lack of US influence rather than the reverse proposition.

One of the few elements of the US-inspired virtual political community (commonly referred to as the ‘netroots’, a term derived from ‘grassroots’) in Australian politics is the prominent online psephologists and associated commentators, most of whom are completely unknown outside of professional political circles. They include Mumble, Possum Comitatus, Pollbludger, Crikey and Antony Green from the ABC. All show a distinctly Australian flavour and focus, although each occasionally engages in commentary about US elections. One aspect of the Australian flavour of these discussions is the frequent assertions made into the accuracy and worth of the ‘betting markets’ in predicting results. Possum Comitatus (also known as Scott Steel) summarised the worth of the betting markets in “Good information makes good markets, and there is no better information than good, independent polling. It provides far more than fodder for horse race political commentary, it provides certainty and knowledge and evidence for observable reality.”

After the 2008 Northern Territory elections there was some discussion about the ‘surprise result’. Although one must assume that the ALP and CLP both conducted polling, there were no publicly available polls during the short period of the NT election campaign. Possum Comitatus explained that “With no major polls in the Territory election, information about the election itself was dominated by party propaganda on the one hand and political commentators staring deeply into their navels on the other …- usually finding little more than lint as a result, but lint dressed up as profundity none the less. It’s a pretty simple rule – you can’t really analyse what you don’t really know. What makes betting markets valuable is their capacity to aggregate all available sources of information to predict a result, but without polling information anchoring the market to some semblance of reality, without that knowledge of what people are actually thinking on the ground, the betting markets were left drifting in the breeze, ostensibly being guided by lint powered column inches telling us that Labor was a shoe in because, well, that’s what ought to happen. Sso should we really be surprised that without political polls running in the Territory campaign, the markets were so out of whack with the result?”

Peter Brent from Mumble.com.au suggested that unsubstantiated explanations were inevitable after an unexpected result: “The days after an election, particularly with an unexpected result, are very silly ones, as people who are paid to do so come up with explanations. The Australian’s wild colonial boy, Paul Toohey, at least admits he doesn’t really know what happened. (But proceeds to explain what happened: an arrogant government – the catchall explanation for every election loss/shock.) Let’s face it, we don’t know why Labor won in 2005 with 58 percent of the vote and nor do we know why last weekend’s affair was about 50-50. Maybe 50-50 is less deserving of explanation than 58-42. To just make reasons up, as many people must (because it’s their job), is worse than useless, because some of these things will become accepted as gospel truth. … On the other hand, it is of course desirable to try to get to the bottom of these things. Anyway, being a pattern-guy, I’m now looking forward to the next WA opinion poll. Perhaps another “arrogant”/out of touch etc government is about to get the heave-ho.

Why Blog about election campaigning?

Posted on Updated on


Why am I (and a few others) blogging about campaigning in Australia and New Zealand?

Lots of reasons! A few years ago (back in 2008) a started a thesis and explained: ‘A quick review of recent Australian research on political campaign techniques, as well as popular literature, reveals no published political campaigning texts or ‘manuals’. There are numerous papers and books on different aspects of campaigning, such as books on media advice and numerous political biographies, as well as accounts of recent election campaigns, but no authoritative texts or manuals that look at Australian political campaigning as a whole, detailing all the aspects of campaigning from the foundations (like strategy, message and finance) to the work that goes on in the trenches as candidates and their teams fight for each individual vote. The two closest texts that can be used as examples of public “campaign handbooks” in Australia are Mills’ ‘The new machine men: polls and persuasion in Australian politics’ and Stockwell’s ‘Political Campaign Strategy – Doing Democracy in the 21st Century’. This apparent disparity in publicly available instructional literature, in comparison to the United States could be due to a number of reasons including differences in historical, political and cultural norms, voting systems, the relative sizes of the political institutions and professional class, as well as financial regulations and wealth.’
The purpose of that thesis (which I haven’t completed as of 2014!:) was to produce scholarly research on campaigning techniques in modern Australian politics. Since I started it (back in 2008) a lot has been written about campaigning techniques in modern Australian politics by MANY other people, including favourites such as Stephen Mills, Peter Brent, Nick Economou, Brian Costar, Sally Young, Mike Smith, John Hart, Ian McAlister, John Warhurst, Wayne Errington, Peter van Onselen  and Jennifer Rayner, just to name a few!

One of the reasons for this blog is the same as that original attempt at a thesis. To create a repository of collected thoughts, experiences and references for my own information and to share with like-minded individuals. Someone also pointed out to me recently (and I suspect it to be true) that more people will eventually read the blog than ever read the thesis anyway! Also this blog will prove one of the universal truths about campaigning, recently paraphrased by our PM: “No single person is the suppository of all wisdom”.

This blog also will (over several years probably 🙂

1. Share lots of stories, jokes and interesting info about campaigning in Australia and New Zealand

2. Question some myths about US-style campaigning in Australia. Australian campaigning news still dominated by US-based media (I’m just as guilty as the next political geek of over-sharing news about Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton)

3. Smash some misinformation shared in the MSM about campaigning in Australia (mostly by sharing wisdom and sage analysis from some of the writers listed above and others).

4. try and bridge the chasm that often separates political scientists and political practitioners, mainly by sharing some of the political wisdom and analysis that is regularly done within academia but doesn’t get much coverage outside of academia.

5. Help me keep numerous links , clippings and references to lots of existing, interesting blogs and media articles that deserve to be congregated in one place for easy future reference. Again, this may take years so please be patient if you read this within the next six months and wonder wtf?! 🙂

6. Share my recently discovered joys and benefits of blogging!